CBC has finally learnt about the Polar-class Amphibious Assault Ships, so now we get to talk about them

Noah Note

Papa Brewster and the CBC have their end of the year interviews slowly rolling out, and with them this year is Vice-Admiral Topshee. It seems like the major media is finally picking up on some of the plans the navy has for the future, this time on the concept of a Polar-capable Amphibious Assault Ship (likely more Landing Platform Dock if being technical).

Of course, we here have been talking about it for a while now. Vice-Admiral Topshee mentioned it in the interview we did with him last month, though privately the idea has been floated around for a while. CBC even referenced our interview! Though sadly they did not link it, nor namedrop us. I appreciate they thought of me! That was pretty cool to wake up to this morning.

As the Royal Canadian Navy continues its quest to establish itself as a Tier 1 force, the concept of acquiring an Amphibious vessel remains one of the more elusive and grand ideas that is currently being floated.

Beyond Corvettes, beyond more JSS, and beyond a fleet of Orca running around like angry little spiders. This remains the crown jewel of the proposed revitalization, the final missing piece that sets Canada firmly in the upper ranks of allies like Italy, France, and the UK.

At least that's the impression you get when you talk around with people about the idea. It's certainly an interesting concept, one that has long persisted since the early days of the Joint Support Ship. Someday I will write about the Advanced Logistics and Sealift Capability (ALSC) Project and the Joint Support Ship that followed it. Maybe I'll even get Mr. Norman to sit down with me, if I beg enough!

Anywho, there is fairly broad support in the RCN for the idea, at least in my talking around. While it's not universal by any means, there is a recognition that the current support fleet is not adequate to support the future fleet that we desire.

Many of you know that for years the desire was always for four JSS to replace the Protecteur-class. This number was eventually cut to three and then the current two, with an option for a third snuck in there and then quickly forgotten and buried.

Two are fine for now when we won’t be seeing significant numbers of new combatants for another decade, however, it won't always be the case. Eventually, we will need more replenishment capability, even in support of our allies.

There's a general recognition that this is going to be an area of struggle for everyone. The United States, as we have discussed before when talking about Sealift, is struggling to keep its own support fleet intact.

The Navy's Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) program, which aims to procure up to 13 new at-sea resupply ships to complement the existing John Lewis-class and Supply-class vessels, is the latest attempt by the United States to build up its replenishment capabilities, yet the project has suffered several delays that have pushed back the first TAOL procurement out to FY2028.

Amongst our European allies, numbers remain fairly constrained to present needs, with little room for excess capacity. The French and Italian navies have only committed to four Vulcano-class each as part of their fleet renewals; the Brits, to their credit, are adding three Fleet Solid Support Ships on top of the four existing Tide-class.

For Canada, the issue is similar to the Sealift issue. Our allies are procuring enough capacity to support themselves, but if we expect external support in this department we will be sorely disappointed. The addition of a new class of Corvettes on top of the fifteen River-class, assuming the navy gets what it wants, will add further demand that two Joint Support Ships just won't cover.

We want a French/British/Italian sized surface fleet that is able to operate simultaneously in three oceans, including deep into the Pacific, but wish to support it with a smaller fleet of smaller replenishment vessels?

Yeah, no. That ain't how that works, and the navy understands this. They always understood that two was too little. It was what we got though in an era of shrinking spending and an apathetic public.

I have debated the admiral on this topic before, as you all know. I have debated many other people on this topic because I am highly skeptical of any sort of Amphibious capability. Although I now understand that the navy does not envision it in the traditional sense, instead viewing it more as a logistical capability, my opinion has still remained skeptical.

To start I can't fault the Arctic argument. I have made similar concerns known. There is no reliable port for us in the Canadian Arctic. There are none planned, be that Grays Bay, Churchill, etc., that can fulfill the desires of a naval base. Nanisivik is Nanisivik, I don't need to say more. While we do have access to Nuuk, which does present a great complement, we do want to have the sovereign capability.

The Navy also desires an independent capability to respond to issues in the Arctic and provide things like HADR. Despite the Coast Guard moving under the DND, and despite the capabilities that platforms like the MPI will bring, they're still not Navy vessels. They still have limitations, and the navy evidently wants something larger and more capable than what even the current Polars could bring to that role.

The Polar Icebreakers don't have the storage and amphibious capabilities to respond to incidents in the Arctic where port facilities might be lacking. They'll also be in high demand themselves for Coast Guard operations. They might not be available.

They don't have a Class II or III hospital able to handle Mass Casualty incidents. They don't have the ability to act as a Command and Control platform. Maybe the Polars could be modified for that role, but as stands that isn't their job, and isn't something we expect them to do.

We have to accept that physical infrastructure might not be the end goal of every situation, and in some cases might not be possible to the degree we desire. To that, I understand the appeals of a vessel like this. It is meant to solve what is a very difficult environment that has long pressed us out. We have tried the physical route and it hasn't worked. Now we look to alternatives.

However, in the quest to resolve such an issue I fear the conversation has leaned too far into that Arctic side without asking if these are supposed to be Arctic vessels or general AAS. The mention of a PC 2 rating is an immediate flag to me for that reason.

If this is meant as an Arctic vessel? Then sure, whatever. I don't believe such a vessel needs to be that high. Maybe a PC 3 or even 4, depending on exactly where you plan to operate and how far into the season, could be a more cost-effective option?

However, if you want this to be a globally-deployable vessel, operating in areas outside the Arctic, then a PC 2 rating quickly becomes a burden, one that someone like myself has to debate the efficiency of.

This is especially true in comparison to the existing Berlin-based JSS. Is it better to use a Polar AAS to do things like HADR in the Caribbean and moving equipment to Europe, or is that something the existing Protecteur-class and a fleet of cheaper Ro/Ro can do just fine, at a cheaper price point, and potentially with a larger capacity overall?

I again refer back to my Sealift article, as I feel we have had this debate before and it provides a full breakdown on such a concept. Two Protecteur-class and two of these ships versus, say, three Protecteur-class and fourish Ro/Ro? Which provides the best combination?

That isn't me dismissing an Amphibious vessel. It is merely me asking where the balance of priorities lies. One of the things I have learnt over the last few months of discussing the navy is that Canada has unique, often contradicting needs that make a lot of procurement conversations difficult. What the Arctic needs is very different from what we need to do to support our NATO commitments in the Atlantic, which in turn is different from the environment we will face in the Pacific, where we wish to take a more active role.

Striking a balance between the needs of three oceans is hard, very hard. It's something that I feel needs to be discussed more by myself, as I have ran into a lot of these struggles and debates just in my own analysis.

A PC 2 Amphibious Assault Ship does not work well outside the Arctic. If your goal is to focus on the Arctic? Then sure, that makes sense. If you want these to be general-purpose vessels? Then we start having to discuss trade-offs and balances. What those are? I don't fully know. Maybe I need to get the Vice-Admiral to sit down with me again and I can try to get it broken down! Maybe we can make it a mini-series and we can go after the future Orca and CSC too.

Of course, I know all of you are gonna be screaming GLAAM. I already wrote a lot about GLAAM, and my opinion remains the same. It feels like what the navy wants, almost perfectly. I wouldn't be surprised if it has served as the basis for a lot of thinking.

Funny enough I know Seaspan has similar concepts somewhere. Perhaps I need to ask the Seaspan media team to dig them up for me. GLAAM is also what I would class as a Joint Support Ship. It isn't fully an Amphibious Assault Ship. It isn't fully an Oiler. It is an amalgamation of these concepts into a singular vessel, similar to how we originally envisioned the Joint Support Ships to be. It's basically Arctic Karel Doorman, which is fine. No hate to Karel D here.

GLAAM is the immediate, fits-the-box solution that I believe the navy wants. I am almost positive, if you read the newsletter this week, that when discussing 'up to five JSS' that they're thinking of something like GLAAM in that mix. That's my little conspiracy. Three Berlin-based JSS and two GLAAM sounds like the working theory in my books. Does that third option still exist? I should ask.

Either way, the navy is teasing, teasing very hard and trying to set the stage for the next Defence Policy Update. CSC already seems to have fairly broad government support for approval, so focus now seems to be on our little crown jewel.

Of course there is still issues with berthing space, crewing, peoples desires to get the army to do amphibious stuff when they very clearly don't want to do it. You can't force them guys. Let it go. All of these are issues that need to be discussed as well. All of which I would tackle in a proper post on the subject.

I hope at least that someone calls them the Queenston-class only for the name to get changed at the last moment. I think it's hilarious to make that a trope, tease Queenston only to rug pull at the last moment. At least that's something I would do for the giggles.

Anywho, something for you to think about over the quiet weekend. Perhaps we need to revisit this concept as a full post again? We kinda have with the GLAAM and Sealift pieces, but I feel this needs like, a dedicated project discussion now that it's becoming public.