Hey! Your welcome! This one was kinda rushed through, wanted to get it put while relevant, so I did skip on my usual discussion and freestyle 😅
1) The armies primary focus with a lot of these procurements is Expeditionary, at least in theory. You'll certainly see a permanent, rotational deployment as part of EFP Latvja There's a pretty good idea of where everything is going.
This might sound like a lot, but they will be enough to equip the force we have and ensure a training stock. This brings us back up to capacity. As for home use? That's not what this platform envisions. There is little worth for a wheeled howitzer in the Arctic.
2) I've never seen a true cost, but talking around I've heard it and LRPF have a similar budget in mind, so between 3.5-4 billion dollars.
3) Agreed! The platform is relatively new, so ordering quick to be ahead makes it far easier to jump on joining the supply chain before it becomes crowded. That requires us to award quick though!
4) I had this talk with a few people recently, and I am of the believe that the requirements should include some form of CUAS capability integrated, even if its a simple non-kinetic capability.
It isn't impossible. It isn't even terribly difficult depending on the level of complexity desired. You know that more than me! I think that will become a standard eventually.
For now, primary CUAS/Air Defence will be provided by other platforms, such as other LAVS or CUAS-based LUV platforms. We do have Phase III of GBAD that will look for this kind of kinetic SHORAD system, but we really need to step up our Tactical air-defence game.
We got A LOT of different CUAS/AD projects going.
5) We have no projects like this in the works, but I've been laboring around this idea of mixing a Strike/BMD capability, but that's my own wacky brain.
Thanks Noah! I read somewhere about the unit economics of modern warfare. E.g. The notion of using a $1m missile to take out a 5k drone e.g. USN SB2 vs. Houthi aerial drone creates a big issue. The paper concluded that in general smaller, cheaper, distributed and expendable systems will dominate one end of the spectrum e.g. drones or small missile boats etc. While at the other end of the spectrum, there is still a role and cost benefit for expensive and long time to order/build, but hard to target or hard to kill complex systems e.g. stealth fighter/bombers etc. The paper concluded that systems in the middle of the spectrum no longer make sense e.g. relatively expensive/hard to build, but not hard to target or kill and are vulnerable to cheap systems.
My point is that relatively cheap ballistic missiles vs. The Expensive platforms they could kill coupled with the relatively scarce ABM systems seems to provide over match opportunities both on land, water and also in space. E.g if u fire 10 ballistic missiles @300k per at a $20B aircraft carrier, 9 may be intercepted but 1 hit would more pay off handsomely! Further, Canada may need rather quickly this type of weapon to deter aggression on our arctic boarders, onshore/offshore and also potentially our southern border.
Good rundown of the RFI. Should note that the infantry took back mortars from the RCA years ago. If this RFI comes to fruition, it will be a boon to both branches. The army had 120 mm in the system at one point, it was divested in '90s IIRC. Everyone wants the 60 mm back in service too, no idea why we got rid of it.
We did have some 120mm back in the day! They were French I believe, though lord knows that I've been trying to dig up in their use the last week, and got nowhere. Might as well not have even existed by that point lol. That's why I consider this a new capability. Enough time has passed and their use was limited.
As for the 60mm? It was replaced by the 40mm CASW, which was deemed to be better suited for what was expected in Afghanistan, more modern, and could fill the role of the 60mm, even if a different system.
It is very much one of the most requested returns that I hear about!
Very exciting! Thanks Noah for the excellent summary! A few comments/questions:
1. Is it fair to say that this RFI is primarily focused on expeditionary force missions and does relatively little for defense of Canada (Arctic, Southern border, etc.)?
2. I wonder what the rough total acquisition costs to be for the whole kit is?
3. I love the implication that Canada produced stuff would be in a good portion of the supply chain!
4. Given arty is a high-value target, what is the current thinking re: anti-drone/tactical anti-air protection for wheeled arty? E.g. would those functions would be supplied by other escort systems following these vehicles around?
5. I wonder if the CAF is considering land-based mobile ballistic and cruise missile systems for both sovereign defence and expeditionary?
I will say that while I love the proposal and find the options very attractive, I am worried about shifting our entire artillery park into SPGs.
Ukraine has offered a counterpoint to the idea that towed guns = obsolescent. One of the most common ways for artillery to be detected and struck since the beginning of the war has actually been while it's moving from one firing position to another. Self-propelled guns are also harder to camouflage- it's not just digging them in, it's also concealing tracks and signs of their movement from UAV observation, etc. Wheeled systems will have an easier time of this than tracked ones, but it's a problem nevertheless. Towed systems are much easier to dig into concealed firing positions- and Ukrainian and Russian experience has both shown that towed M777s (or comparable Russian systems) dug in and with good overhead concealment are very hard to fix and destroy even for a UAV and counterbattery environment as ruthless as the Ukrainian front line.
I fear an outcome similar to what 41 CMBG found with its M113s during the Bronze Rampart exercises- that, vulnerable as they were to WarPac fires, rather than offering infantry mobility the infantry often required TOWs and artillery support to be pulled from other tasks to help unpin them and allow them to extricate themselves from sticky situations. In this instance, if SPGs require enablers to create windows of safety from UAVs, loitering munitions etc. to move, and if they are harder to conceal in their firing positions over time, which forces them to move more often to stay survivable, then it could create a lot of strain on resources that would already be in high demand from the rest of the battlegroup.
Not to say that SPGs are bad- they are undeniably incredibly useful. But I think towed systems like the M777 would be worth retaining.
Great points Luke! I assume that if/when the tender/contract gets finished, the CAF will have tranches or options on the final numbers of units purchased? Flexibility is critical at this time as mission fit may change e.g. NATO may not survive until the June Summit - Merz, new German Leader. Also, the pendulum has swung in favour of aerial drones in combat now, however a tremendous amount of R&D is pouring into counters to that e.g. kinetic shooty things like 30mm auto cannons, directed microwave drone swam killers, lasers, jammers etc. is it feasible that over the next 2-5 years drones will have more limited impact?
Hey! Your welcome! This one was kinda rushed through, wanted to get it put while relevant, so I did skip on my usual discussion and freestyle 😅
1) The armies primary focus with a lot of these procurements is Expeditionary, at least in theory. You'll certainly see a permanent, rotational deployment as part of EFP Latvja There's a pretty good idea of where everything is going.
This might sound like a lot, but they will be enough to equip the force we have and ensure a training stock. This brings us back up to capacity. As for home use? That's not what this platform envisions. There is little worth for a wheeled howitzer in the Arctic.
2) I've never seen a true cost, but talking around I've heard it and LRPF have a similar budget in mind, so between 3.5-4 billion dollars.
3) Agreed! The platform is relatively new, so ordering quick to be ahead makes it far easier to jump on joining the supply chain before it becomes crowded. That requires us to award quick though!
4) I had this talk with a few people recently, and I am of the believe that the requirements should include some form of CUAS capability integrated, even if its a simple non-kinetic capability.
It isn't impossible. It isn't even terribly difficult depending on the level of complexity desired. You know that more than me! I think that will become a standard eventually.
For now, primary CUAS/Air Defence will be provided by other platforms, such as other LAVS or CUAS-based LUV platforms. We do have Phase III of GBAD that will look for this kind of kinetic SHORAD system, but we really need to step up our Tactical air-defence game.
We got A LOT of different CUAS/AD projects going.
5) We have no projects like this in the works, but I've been laboring around this idea of mixing a Strike/BMD capability, but that's my own wacky brain.
Thanks Noah! I read somewhere about the unit economics of modern warfare. E.g. The notion of using a $1m missile to take out a 5k drone e.g. USN SB2 vs. Houthi aerial drone creates a big issue. The paper concluded that in general smaller, cheaper, distributed and expendable systems will dominate one end of the spectrum e.g. drones or small missile boats etc. While at the other end of the spectrum, there is still a role and cost benefit for expensive and long time to order/build, but hard to target or hard to kill complex systems e.g. stealth fighter/bombers etc. The paper concluded that systems in the middle of the spectrum no longer make sense e.g. relatively expensive/hard to build, but not hard to target or kill and are vulnerable to cheap systems.
My point is that relatively cheap ballistic missiles vs. The Expensive platforms they could kill coupled with the relatively scarce ABM systems seems to provide over match opportunities both on land, water and also in space. E.g if u fire 10 ballistic missiles @300k per at a $20B aircraft carrier, 9 may be intercepted but 1 hit would more pay off handsomely! Further, Canada may need rather quickly this type of weapon to deter aggression on our arctic boarders, onshore/offshore and also potentially our southern border.
Good rundown of the RFI. Should note that the infantry took back mortars from the RCA years ago. If this RFI comes to fruition, it will be a boon to both branches. The army had 120 mm in the system at one point, it was divested in '90s IIRC. Everyone wants the 60 mm back in service too, no idea why we got rid of it.
We did have some 120mm back in the day! They were French I believe, though lord knows that I've been trying to dig up in their use the last week, and got nowhere. Might as well not have even existed by that point lol. That's why I consider this a new capability. Enough time has passed and their use was limited.
As for the 60mm? It was replaced by the 40mm CASW, which was deemed to be better suited for what was expected in Afghanistan, more modern, and could fill the role of the 60mm, even if a different system.
It is very much one of the most requested returns that I hear about!
Very exciting! Thanks Noah for the excellent summary! A few comments/questions:
1. Is it fair to say that this RFI is primarily focused on expeditionary force missions and does relatively little for defense of Canada (Arctic, Southern border, etc.)?
2. I wonder what the rough total acquisition costs to be for the whole kit is?
3. I love the implication that Canada produced stuff would be in a good portion of the supply chain!
4. Given arty is a high-value target, what is the current thinking re: anti-drone/tactical anti-air protection for wheeled arty? E.g. would those functions would be supplied by other escort systems following these vehicles around?
5. I wonder if the CAF is considering land-based mobile ballistic and cruise missile systems for both sovereign defence and expeditionary?
I will say that while I love the proposal and find the options very attractive, I am worried about shifting our entire artillery park into SPGs.
Ukraine has offered a counterpoint to the idea that towed guns = obsolescent. One of the most common ways for artillery to be detected and struck since the beginning of the war has actually been while it's moving from one firing position to another. Self-propelled guns are also harder to camouflage- it's not just digging them in, it's also concealing tracks and signs of their movement from UAV observation, etc. Wheeled systems will have an easier time of this than tracked ones, but it's a problem nevertheless. Towed systems are much easier to dig into concealed firing positions- and Ukrainian and Russian experience has both shown that towed M777s (or comparable Russian systems) dug in and with good overhead concealment are very hard to fix and destroy even for a UAV and counterbattery environment as ruthless as the Ukrainian front line.
I fear an outcome similar to what 41 CMBG found with its M113s during the Bronze Rampart exercises- that, vulnerable as they were to WarPac fires, rather than offering infantry mobility the infantry often required TOWs and artillery support to be pulled from other tasks to help unpin them and allow them to extricate themselves from sticky situations. In this instance, if SPGs require enablers to create windows of safety from UAVs, loitering munitions etc. to move, and if they are harder to conceal in their firing positions over time, which forces them to move more often to stay survivable, then it could create a lot of strain on resources that would already be in high demand from the rest of the battlegroup.
Not to say that SPGs are bad- they are undeniably incredibly useful. But I think towed systems like the M777 would be worth retaining.
Great points Luke! I assume that if/when the tender/contract gets finished, the CAF will have tranches or options on the final numbers of units purchased? Flexibility is critical at this time as mission fit may change e.g. NATO may not survive until the June Summit - Merz, new German Leader. Also, the pendulum has swung in favour of aerial drones in combat now, however a tremendous amount of R&D is pouring into counters to that e.g. kinetic shooty things like 30mm auto cannons, directed microwave drone swam killers, lasers, jammers etc. is it feasible that over the next 2-5 years drones will have more limited impact?